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Architecture is political, or it is not.  Architecture is media, or it is not.  Architecture is about form, or it is not.  The formulation, ‘arch is…’ is obsolete, or it is not.  And so on…
Catherine Ingraham.






	Antiquated canons of objectivism and subjectivism permeate art/chitectural theory.  They are unavoidable.  However, in the past 70 years, these traditional attitudes have opened up to the possibility that meaningful art/chitectural theories do no have to fit neatly into one or the other category to have substantial impact on the products and works of contemporary art and architecture.  This awareness is the result of an infinitely complex historical evolution in all realms of human life, but the role of the human body in meaning- making has emerged in scientific and philosophical disciplines to assume a particular pride of place amongst theoretical discussions in the past 30 years.  In the following sections of this thesis, the constraints and entailments of embodiment (as mind inseparable from body) will be focused on and projected into relationships with art/architeral design as a means for informing the process of (re)creating experience for human bodies.  But before I begin to investigate the connections between the body and art/chitecture,  I mean to address the context of languagge as the primary medium for this thesis. 
	Antiquated canons of objectivism and subjectivism permeate art and architectural theory.  They are unavoidable.  However, in the past 70 years, these traditional attitudes have opened up to the possibility that meaningful theories do no have to fit neatly into categories to have substantial impact on the products and works of contemporary art and architecture.  This awareness is the result of an a complex evolution in all realms of human life, but the role of the human body in meaning making has emerged in scientific and philosophical disciplines to assume a particular pride of place amongst theoretical discussions in the past 30 years.  In the following sections of this thesis, I will examine the physical and lived human body.  In particular, the entailments of embodiment (experience as the conscious human animal, or as a human organism with mind inseparable from its physical body), will be focused on and projected into art and architectural design as a means for informing the process of (re-)creating human experience.  But before I narrate this investigation, I mean to address the context of language as the primary medium for this thesis.
An exemplary influence in my cautious approach to the role of language in this study is particularly influenced by Michel Foucault’s investigation into the natural history of western cultures from over the past 400-500 years.  In “The Order of Things,” Foucault builds a contemporary understanding of natural history and science by calling attention to the common foundations in western cultures.  By sSeeking to identify and bring order to the history of knowledge (in other words, to bring knowledge of knowledge),  Foucault, Foucault identifies a threshold between “Classical” and “Modern” modes of thinking that hinges, hinging on the role of language in each episteme,   “when words ceased to intersect with representation and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge of things,” (304).  Fundamentally, this threshold separates an approach to language as a spontaneous means for discourse and language as an objective and finite form of knowledge.    The latter, - “Modern - understandingModern” assumption or awareness that all reasonableknowable  thingsconcepts can must be fragmented  into the space of a universal taxonomic grid, seems  to be a polar polemically oppositeed  toof a “Classical” reliance  episteme that relies much more on contextual resemblance and spontaneous imagination as the foundation of discourse.  My .  
It is not my intentionpurpose here is not to ally myselfpledge allegiance to (at this point) with either episteme definitively.  Contrarily, ,  but to include here an observation that I am interested in the potential of operating within (between??)between the extremes, and the assumption that more than one episteme can coexist simultaneously of the two..
  HopingEager to find some in- between ground on which to work, I am making this the following assumption:  Human experience, and therefore knowledge (as knowledge for someone, not absolute and universal) does not have to be reducible to language as a context-independent sign system that bears meaning through taxonomic relationships alone.  Thus, distanced from an authoritative role, language more aligned in discourse begins to achieve the “transparency and neutrality,” (Foucault 56), needed to  Hopefully this assumption will accommodate a liberated/more free investigation into the experienced forms of order that permeate and typify the human body and supports a logic that is lived through and experienced,  rather than a logic removed from subjective and contextual relationships in experience,  etherized upon a universal and fragmented tabula.  Asexperience.  As a way of being in the world (discourse), language seems toalso regains a sense of unification that “Modern” theories can’t similarly access through an affinity for a fragmented and differentiated conceptual structuring of meaning via language.  
By making theise distinctions,  I am also hopingintend to avoid any desire to distinguish and d defininge the boundaries ofbetween art/chitectureart and architecture as a means for asserting their the identity of one or the otheridentities (whose???) – anticipating a universal and absolute identity through categorization is misleading.  .  This desire, evinced in the Modern episteme that continues to permeate contemporary western cultures, seems rigid and misleading in its assumption that the identity of art/chitecture might be wholly drawn out and categorized through universal concepts.  
	Here follows my second (at least) fundamental assumption:  it is not possible to separate art/chitecture from experience so that it might be universally known and understood by everyone, norAccordingly,  is it possibleit is impossible to literally and comprehensively address the broad range of contemporary experiences, styles, and forms that are might be art/istic or architecturall. . In e As part of experience,  art/chitecture havexperience for someone, art and architecture are characterized by non-literal and pre-reflective components that are fundamental to the structure of experience, such as qualities and emotions, which can’t be fully investigated through literal means aloneare not wholly conceptual or propositional in literal terms.    AnticipatingPresupposing the exploration of metaphorical structures of understanding to be drawn out more thoroughly in the following sections, an imaginative utterance and it is unnecessary and impossible to be comprehensive with athe literal paraphrase of that utterance are not the same things, and they inherently function on different but interrelated orders of human meaning.of distinctly metaphorical and imaginative concepts.  Furthermore, the literal paraphrase cannot possibly mean the same as a metaphorically structured utterance or a figurative work of art.   This In the present discussion, this leads to an inherent difference between the project and work  of art/chitecture  and and what is said about itthem., so   I will proceed with an awareness of the particular constraints and affordances of language in imaginative and experiential pursuits.  This written project is intended to be a means for sharing the basic structure of the body in relation to design and the inherent possibilities of experiential and embodied minds.  The A thorough investigation into the relative effectiveness meaning or applicability comprehensibility of an specific aspectsapplication of embodied logic to the artistic process will be pursued in andwill  be through such processes and art/chitecturalistic (re-)making or doing, which has a necessary future component that transcendsare necessarily forthcoming and transcend the scope of the present studynarrative.  The This distinction here observed is included as a reminder that this the discussion underway is not an isolated,  or whole, or comprehensive occurrence, but more of a framework for action. 









Architecture is political, or it is not.  Architecture is media, or it is not.  Architecture is about form, or it is not.  The formulation, ‘arch is…’ is obsolete, or it is not.  And so on…





The question now before me has emerged from an interest in the relationship between human beings and the artifacts we (re)produce.  More particularly, the question addresses the relationship between human bodies and the built struurctures that we (re)construct.  The question is, quite frankly, is what can the human body afford art/chitectural design as a structural metaphorical concept?  This is not a new or revolutionary question, but one that adapts diverse forms through the history of art/chitectural designThe response is, would you know, not quite so frank.  For me, the question emerged from a pursued interest in the relationship between humans and the artistic artifacts we re-produce.   Perhaps oneOne of the most intriguing aspects ofthings about art and architectural design is that, after thousands of years, these fundamental questions are still this relationship is still unclear in contemporary discussionsrelevant.  Relevant to whom?  Any human body that might interact with the built environment, it 
seems. In this section, I begin to draw out the metaphorical entailments of embodiment by introducing the opposing dualistic body of containment.  From this external body, I take my departure into the three interrelated realms of embodied experience that suggest meaningful ways to re-approach design through a metaphorical body of inhabitation. 
…
My interest inFor me, approaching art/chitectural theory, by waythe metaphorical relationship between  of the human body and architecture, coagulated in the whole and proportionate bodies of Leon Battista Alberti’s architectural manifesto, The Ten Books of Architecture.  Written in the 15th Century,  Alberti’s manuscript coincides with the “Classic” revival of the European Renaissance and is considered to be vitally influential to the art/chitecture from this periodinto European Renaissance theoriesarchitecture.  One of the recurring themes in Alberti’s main concerns for art/chitectureworkTen Books is that any architectural work or project should be executed so that “all things naturally occur to make the whole,,” (2Bbook IIii, Cch xiiXII(24)).  .  ----------------Wholeness is desirable in Alberti's theory because of the dignity, grace, and harmony that it providessuggests.  

To exemplify and structure his athedesiredthe senseoccurenceoccurrence an approach to this of sense of wholeness that Alberti desires as a universally valid design approachin architecture that Alberti desires, Alberti heAlberti turns to the examples found fromin "“Nature,."”   ParticularlyOf theAmongst the variety of examples provided, Alberti repeatedly includes, he focuses most heavily,  observes citesonthand observes ae resemblance between the naturally ocurring proportionate structures composition of physical/naturalnatural bodies ocurringand the naturally and finds a resemblance in the parts to whole relationship inherent into the compositionthe potential for a similar arrangementdisposition ofthe relationship between the  the parts and spaces ofinof built structures.  (This relationship is best described as a parts-to-whole relation concerns the disparate materials used to compose the integrated edifice, which can be identified not only as a amalgam of parts, but also as an ordered whole.)  From this resemblance, Alberti hedraws the conclusion thatAlberti concludes:,  “
[A]as in an animal, the head, feet, and every particular member, should be exactly proportioned to all the other members, and to the rest of the body, ; so in a building […] all the parts should be made to correspond so exactly, that , let us consider which of them we please, it may bear its just proportion to all the rest.”  (Book VII, Ch V(190)).  

Although it is not explicit ashe does not explicitly identify the metaphorical structure of this approachmethod is not explicitly identified , Alberti is utilizingutilizesprojects anthethe empirically observationed of n empircal the metaphorical structure of physical bodies,    Just as the question posed from the outset of this section, Alberti'bservation is nothing new.  "Nature" is   "Natural"                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Alberti   Here is a clear example of the body, and particularly the e human body,, ((in regard to the proportioning systems of the Cclassical Greek orders of inGreek art/chitecture), to) affording a structured coherent and orderly approach tomeans for structuringordering the distribution of building componentsan approach to the art/chitecturedesigning architectural  projectsdesign.    (Later, this structuring of one domain by another will be identified as the primary structure of metaphorical structures.  In this case, a whole body of parts is projected onto building organization for the purpose of achieving a sense of wholeness.)  
CenturiesHundreds of years later, towardin the middle of the 20th Century, the French architect, Le Corbusier, reinvigorates tTheis approach to the scalability of the human bodybuilding architectural designvia a proportionate system based on the human body is reinvigorated  in early mid-20th Century art/chitecuralarchitectural theory by Le Corbusier.  Seeking to redefine the Modern spirit, Le CorbusierHe pre-supposes the potential forto radically reform the industries and practices of architecture through the development such aof an international proportioning systeman international system of proportion capable of radically reforming the industries and practices of architecture.    Whereas Alberti's proportioning was intended to be unique and specific to each building, Le Corbusier attemptsted to draft a universal measure that can apply to all types of buildings.  In light of this potentialthis light, Le Corbusier develops a modulor the "“Modulor"”(IMAGE 2) -– a  system of measurement and proportion adopted from “the determining points of his [man’s] occupation in of space - foot, solar plexus, head, tips of fingers of the upraised arm”(Mod 1,Modulor 1 ???55).  
  to draft a universal measure, based on the human scale,  Le Corbusier’sThe Modulor is rooted firmly in Renaissance philosophy and relied on its Classical ancestry for justification, and has it', andbut it also sought eeksto advance on this foundation by relating focusing onthe appropriateness of the Modular regardingin facilitating e  particular advantages its rational  to the methods of of pre-manufacturing and mass production and the certain advantage of mass-producing and constructing buildings from proportionate and interrelated parts. Contrary to the Classical approach, which develops the proportions of a building on an individual basis (IMAGE 3)approach to proportioning systems is  buildings derivesdevelops internally fromto derive itsthe relationships of the parts and whole from an internal and o be in  (although there are common Orders), the Modulor attempts to draft a universal measure that applies, which to all types of buildings in allanyall types of contextss.  AgainAlthough this critical difference leads to drastically differentdissimilar theoriesresultsDespite these differences however, in both cases we havexemplify an the approach to an orderingapproaches to architectural design systems based onstructured by the apparent proportions of the human body and perceived expectedtthat canattemptsthat attempts too facilitate the means for achievingachieve a wholeness orand harmony in the built environment that iswouldis otherwise be lackingthrough a metaphorical integration of the physical structure of the human bodydesirable but l. 
	A common thread in each of these two approaches to the body in architectural designe – and the one from which I am tmaking my departureThe misconception, which marks my departure from these theories, is the absence of a – is the treatment understandingof the lived human body in respect to the physical human bodyand its role lived body in architectural experiencearchitecture.   The physical body assumesplays a central role in the organization of architectural elements, but recedes into the background of intellectual architectural experience.  In shortbrief, the lived body isiss absent.  d body i For Alberti, architecture is “firmly […] rooted in the mind of man,” (preface).  Four hundred yearsCenturies later, according to Le Corbusier, “man has a ‘material body;’, he occupies space by the movemnent movement of his members [...] but only his spirit is involved; the body remains withinwithin its old functions and limits,”(Modulord 2, 199).    Neither arct/chitect ct purposelyintentionally directly addressesallocates or observeobservescreditsmentions the importance of the body as part of the lived architectural harrt/chitectural  experiencein understanding or experiencing architecture,   and exclusively but delegate place allocate solely delegatestingthis responsibility y solely y squarely in the seat ofontoto the mind of man.  Although they are both clearlyevidently concerned with the internal (subjective) experience of architecture, and repeatedlyfrequently discussing the dignity, gracerhythm, balance, and harmony ofin the buildings they are advocatingadvocate, there is no intimate connection between the experience of these conditionsqualities and the lived body. , nor anyFurthermore, the metaphorical structuringesconcepts that emerge in each of their theories are  of their proportionate systems based on the external and physical bodiesy of proportionate but disparate partsthat contain the mind of man, but remain separate from the structures of abstract intellectual concepts and meaningful experience.  For this reason, Ii am interpreting presenting these two examples as representatives of the mind-/body dualism that has pervadedcontinues to pervade western thought for hundreds of years and fails to appreciate the role of the human body in human lived experience.   
…
In hopesHopingWilling ofto reinvigorateing and progressing my an alternate approach to the human body in/as art/and architecture,  I am pursuing an alternate awareness of the human bodyexperience that finds nofounded on anthe ins separableility of humanation between the bodyybody and  mind and body in experience.  The concept of a unified human body and mindorganism leads to the “embodied mind,” which is structured by interaction with/in lived through asphysical, cultural, and phenomenological contexts physically and , sociallyculturally, and experientially structured “embodiment.”  This alternative awarenessThe interactive and directed body of the human body accommodates an expansion ofexpandss on the dualisticthe metaphorical scope of the metaphorical approach totreatment of the bodybody in art/ and architecture that I will access exemplifythrough figurative and experiential structures that emerge from embodimentthe following three interrelated characteristics of embodied experience.  These figurative structures of bodily experience - synaesthetic, imaginative, and place-basedporous –  suggest/embody/present the potential for the re-newed approaches to art/chitectural design that I alluded to in the preface.  As scientific and philosophical studies show, these structures are neither absolutely subjective nor objective in experience, and they suggest implyinherently providinge alternative metaphorical entailments andstructures and contexts that are both quantifiably and qualitatively meaningful in art/chitectural design and human experience.  suggest an imaginative approach to the body in architecture that maintains a coherent and shared logic, without reverting to entirely objective or subjective categories of differentiation.






























































Colonization of the earth by animal species can be identified as stretching back 345 million years.  Primates, the animal family humans are grouped into, began to colonize the canopies of forests 65 million years ago.  Human evolution has been a process of adapting from life in the exterior branches of those canopies to a terrestrial life of bipedal locomotion.  Bipedalism - the ability to locomote on two legs - is widely credited as one of the key adaptive privileges of our ancestry that led to culture and the human conscious in their contemporary forms.  Social characteristics common to our primate family - as the relationship between mother and child, or male and female - have also been critical to our adaptation, but bipedality is the most highly evolved (to date) locomotory pattern in the primate family.  Arms and hands freed from any critical role in locomotion afford a greater freedom to communicate and make tools especially useful in satisfying our daily needs.  The simultaneous adaptation of our ancestors’ locomotory systems and the tools they began to fashion as a result (language included), along with increasingly complex social structures, led to the advancement of cultures and intelligent species of primates and ultimately to our to contemporary human species.  Even if we credit the species Australopithecus, living 4-5 million years ago, as the clearest forerunner to contemporary humans, we’re still considering a period of 4-5 million years.  The account of human evolution cannot be simple, and most of the influences contributing to our contemporary physical bodies are impossibly irretrievable, but we must progress on the assumption that each day of the past 4-5 million years (relatively) has passed and is integrated one to the next, regardless of the events.  
I have chosen to highlight this narrowly focused version of human evolution for a few reasons:  An contemporary understanding of our contemporary bodies as adapted organisms adapting through an eternallyeternityity of adaptation requires a certain awareness of the impermanence of our cultures and the human bodies and intellects vital to their identities.  New technologies and new modes of thinking will affect the adaptation of the human body based on an empirical observation of the current model.  Such adaptation is not necessarily unidirectional or always progressive, suggesting that “knowledge” is very much a learned and adaptive human order that has evolved to its current forms in much the same way as a baby matures into an adult, learning to live in the world as a human body.  The learning process is inherently characterized by false assumptions, successes, erratic progressions and digressions, all of which are context dependent and therefore intimately related to the environment and experience of such process.  “Knowledge,” as experienced for/by someone, is therefore characterized by these susceptibilities. 
	
With human evolution in the foreground of the subject matter, I will return to the understanding of body and its physical structures.  Although we can reduce our physicality to cellular structures – the lowest denominator of all living matter – the body is a highly specialized and integrated organism.  Human Occidental folklore traditionally identifies five senses as our primary modes of contact with the physical worldin the perceptual cycles of experience:  vision, touch, taste, smell, and hearing.  However, our physical bodies are very much more involved and alive in the world, even though we are often not unconscious of it.  . Modes of contact with/in the world that are often present in consciousness, but aren’t commonly grouped into the sensory systems of western tradition, are the sensations of bodily position and movements (kinesthesia), spatial relationships (proprioception), and the sensations of memory and reason (common sense).   Some examples of unconscious contact would be the circulatory, respiratory, and or digestive systems, which we might only notice if we’re excercising or eating something that upsets us.  Some other modes of contact with the world that are often present in consciousness, but aren’t commonly grouped into the sensory systems of western folklores, are the ability to sense spatial relationships and gravity (proprioception), as well as the senses of memory or reason (common sense).
	All of our senses, – or perhaps all of our systems of contact with or ways of being in the worldenvironment – , are constantly interacting and incorporated into onein the coherent physical system organism that we identify as the human body.  The brain and the central nervous system are largely generally creditedrecognized for interpreting, storing, and responding to the impulses of all the body’s systems.  For this reason, the brain is often singled out from the rest of the body as the locus source of intellectual experience in western traditions, which ultimately gives way to dualistic theories that elevate or separate the human mind from its corporeality.  However, removed from the body, the brain ceases to live and becomes a lifeless lump pilemass of organic tissue.  In the physical structure of the lived body, each and every organ is incorporated intoall organs simultaneously contribute to the composition of sensorimotory experience; the brain is another organ in thisis complex structure that relies as much on the epidermis as the cerebellum..
	The sensorimotor states of the holistic body are integrated with/in the environment as structures and patterns of energy.The brain’s role in the physical body partly involves the conscious and unconscious integration of bodily systems through the distribution of energies  aa.  Of particular interest in the empirical observation of conscious and unconscious neuronal activity is the development of neuronal mapping (generated primarily in the field of cognitive neuroscience), which provides a means to observe and map the structures and patterns of energy in the brain as a human subject interacts with the world  A majority of this energy is organized unconsciously, and therefore the technology to empirically observe these patterns has only recently developed through digital technology.  In particular, the field of cognitive neuroscience uses a method of observation called neuronal mapping, which creates images from the structures of energy that emergeemerging while a body interacts with its environment.  
.Neuronal mapping reveals that our embodied brains are constantly processing input from all of our sensory systems simultaneously.  Cognitive scientists relate the neuronal components of these structures to “large ensembles that are constantly disappearing and arising through their cooperative interactions and in which every neuron has multiple and changing responses in a context-dependent manner,” (Rosch, et al 94).  As a result, eThis eEmpirical research is indicatingindicates that t our sensorimotor systems are far fromactivity is not isolated in separate neuronal receptors composing parts of the brain.  In experience, , and “the dense interconnections among its components entail that eventually everything going on will be a function of what all the components are doing,” (Rosch, et al 94).   Thus,This ensures that anyAny state of perception of sensuous contenthuman experience  is the result of neurons acting in global and local patterns.  Perceptual cycles are therefore characterized by context-dependent patterns of “cross-modal” structures arising from sensorimotor interaction with the environment.     Neuronal mapping reveals empirical evidences for a grounding of imaginative meaning in the body.  
The neuronal structures of the five haptic senses of the body reveal that aAlthough our senses may only be incorporated into conscious experience for fleeting and vibrant moments, they are constantly structuring patterns of thought, interacting with and informing experience.  We often narrow down sensuous experience to a particular realm or sensory system as a convenient way to identify the components of the experience as such, so that we might grasp its form or composition in detail so that we can arrive at the smell of lavender or the taste of raspberries.  However, even though our experience can be highly focused into one realm of our sensous physical structure, our bodies are constantly seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, feeling, and remembering our way in/through the world.  Both conscious and unconscious states of being are simultaneous and constant, but perhaps not always “present” in experience.  

Empirical research based on neuronal mapping reveals that our brains are constantly processing input from all of our sensory systems simultaneously.  Contemporary cognitive neuroscientists identify the neuronal components of these structures as “members of large ensembles that are constantly disappearing and arising through their cooperative interactions and in which every neuron has multiple and changing responses in a context-dependent manner” (Rosch, et al 94).  As a result, empirical research is indicating that our sensorimotor systems are far from isolated to individual parts of the brain, and any perception of sensuous content is the result of neurons acting in global and local patterns.  
	Context dependent patterns of sensorimotor systems are referred to as multi-modal or cross-modal structures of perception emerging from our physical structures.  An understanding of the perceptual cycle hinges of human being hinges on the interconnectivity of these multi or cross-modal structures.  Consequently, we are not onlySensorimotor structures of energy in the body ensure that, not only are we we are not only capable of perceiving the sweetsweetness in the aroma of the a lavenderlilac blossom,blossom –; we can also feel the delicacy of the aroma.  If we are investigating a grouping of blossoms, we might can also feel the posture of the branch that is collects and supports the lavenderlilac flowers from the pull of gravity (IMAGE 4).  This felt correspondence is principally due to the mirror capacity of the motor cortex, which is another integral component of the sensorimotor functioning of the human body.  Because of this capacity, what we perceive in other things, such as posture and the effects of gravity on physical bodies, we can also feel and perceive in ourselves.  
Lingering on the lilac blossom for a moment longer, we might trigger a childhood memory of a childhood backyard or a gravel alley on the way to school emerges.  Soon, we’re on the phone laughing with an old friend about the day we skipped school to go swimming in the river.  Emerging fFrom a seemingly inconsequential lilac blossom, past, present, and future are unified through sensuous experience is always already enriched and deepened by the interchanges and patterning of the integrated physical human body.

This   These patterns of the motor cortex, woven with the structures of sensuous experience,  lead to a certain network of possibilities for interaction based on the affordances and limitations to the structures of experiential, embodied logic.  They also lead to the synaesthetic physical structure of experience characterized by vvVariegated sensory sensorimotor interaction between the human body and its environment leads to and structures what is evidently a synaesthetic mode of experienceinput. Although our senses may only be incorporated consciously for fleeting andyet vivid moments, they are fundamentallyconstantly interacting through all modes of thought and beingout the perceptual cycle.  Our bodies are continuously seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, feeling, and remembering our way in and through the world.    In this way, we arrive at a visual domain that is not only characterized by sight, but all of the sensuous body simultaneously.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty summarizes this intersensory experience fittingly in The Phenomenology of Perception, observing the following:
The senses intercommunicate by opening onto the structure of the thing.  One sees the hardness and brittleness of glass […] the springiness of steel, the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of shavings.  The form of objects is not their geometrical shape:  it stands in a certain relation to their specific nature and appeals to all our other senses as well as sight.  (229)





. Characterized by integrated conscious and unconscious states of being in the world, hHuman experience assumes a certain degree of obscurity from the constancy and intercommunication of the sensorimotor systems. This makes it difficult to gauge the definite contribution of any specific sense in isolation, leading to a visual domain of experience that is not only characterized by sight, but a collaborative synaesthesia.   Both conscious and unconscious states of being are simultaneous and constant, but not always “present” in experience.  Furthermore, Dewey observes that, “about every explicit and focal object there is a recession into the implicit which is not intellectually grasped,” (194).  This makes it difficult toIn an interconnected and multi-modal system, however, the unconscious structures of experience are no less critical than conscious sensorimotor interaction in determining the identity of the perceptual cycle.  These unconscious influences in perceived experience resemble the quality of experience that John Dewey observes as “just that which it is and nothing else,” (192).  Quality, like unconscious interaction with the environment, can only be identified reflectively and always in terms of something else.  But these obscure forms of experience are possibilities for interaction that can only be inhabited.  A living body experiences meaningful dimensions of reality that are wholly implicit and pre-conceptual.  Art and architecture, as experience for some body, interact with the body in these qualitative, implicit, or unconscious dimensions regardless.  But the potential for a meaningful incorporation of these implicit dimensions into art and architecture is only afforded by an intersensory, embodied experience.  What might happen if we allow the metaphorical entailments of the unconscious body to structure the artistic process?  gauge the definite contribution of any specific sense in isolation.
Sensitivity to the interrelated networks of kinaesthetics, proprioception, or touchfeel and sound inin an experience can inform the processes involved in re-making artistic projects.  This is perhaps a rather banal observation.  But these interrelated modes of experience are the foundations of human thought.  They are the shared and pervasive interaction of the body that inhabits its environment.  Therefore, these networks can be explored in meaningful ways through the artistic process.  Feelings, textures, sounds, flavors, spatial orientation and posture are all relevant aesthetic dimensions that can afford unique structures of experience that challenge the visually dominated “aesthetic” pursuit of artistic composition and expand possibilities for expressive interaction, communication, and awareness with/in the environment.
The Blur project from the 2002 Swiss Expo is a contemporary example where traditional visual and architectural identities are challenged for the sake of intersensory human experience (IMAGE 5).  For this project, the architects, Diller and Scofidio, recreate a built experience that achieves its primary structural identity through a cloud of water vapor.  When a body enters this cloud, the dominance of sight in the perceptual cycle is challenged, so that other awareness'es of spatial orientation and experience emerge. This experience creates a unique environment for interaction and inhabitation that denies a conception of place based on an externalized and physical container secondary toremoved from experience.  Rather, the use of water to achieve an obscure formal arrangement and to intentionally blur the visual domain assumes synaesthetic modes of being in the world that do not rely on permanence or regularity of form for comprehensive and meaningful experience.
…













































































	In the interest of identifying theThe following section will draw the connections between cross-modally structured interaction with the environment and metaphorical thought processes, so that imagination can be understood as a rational logic lived through that is essential the to human experience of place. 




	A borrowing between and integrating of bodily systems in the brain disCtinguish cross-modal structures of neuronal activity are distinguished by “cooperative interactions […] in which every neuron has multiple and changing responses in a context-dependent manner,” (Rosch, et al 94).  These interrelated patternings of energy are the structures of human thought.  Accordingly, they give rise to and structure the imaginative logic of metaphor.  This Mostpatterning of neuronal activity is commonly shared by all groups of human beings, due to the relative similarity of our bodies.  These two characteristics of physical structures are fundamental to the identity of metaphorical structures.  The primary feature of metaphorical structure is – like sensorimotor organization – that the structures of certain (domain) contexts are imaginatively projected onto the structures of other (target) contexts.  More aptly explained as “a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience to structure another domain of a different kind” (Johnson, Body in the Mind, xiv-xv), metaphor is what makes reason, understanding, and meaning possible in embodied philosophiesemerges from imaginative thought processes that reflect on and make inferencesthat accommodate reflection and inference between the structures of interactive experience.  While metaphorical projection seems unlimited , due to athe seamless interrelatedness of domains, it is context-dependent like all other experience, and therefore limited by the organism-environment relationships that are consciously or unconsciously incorporated in the projections..  
The Metaphorical projection, or “imaginative rationality” (Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors 193),various modes of imaginatively structured thought are can only be as diverse as the subjects bodies that experience them, but there are many forms that are shared.  Not surprisingly, the structures that are shared emerge from our sensorimotor functioning of the human boitdy.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, thTherse are, however, primary metaphors “linkthat “link our subjective experience and judgementsjudgments to our sensorimotor experience [and] supply the logic, the imagery, and the qualitative feel of sensorimotor experience to abstract concepts,” (Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy In the Flesh,y  128).  Lakoff and Johnson are identifying a preIn their essenseessence, primary metaphors emerge from our bodily interaction with/in the environment and pre-reflectively structure our thought processes based on this interaction.reflective projection of the cross-modal structures of sensorimotor perception into the structures of our abstract conceptualizations of experience and modes of being in the world.  This metaphorical projection is the foundation of shared imaginative thinking  .
Once considered to be an acrobatic, but subjective and irrelevant linguistic device, metaphor is now undeniably central in human experience.  The structured emergence of metaphorical concepts from the physical structure of the human body can be characterized by the restriction/patterning of energies according to the relationships specific to the context.  Not only are the function/processes of this restructuring limited by the physical structures of embodimentThese primary and shared forms of imagination, the restructuring is coherently “ordered” by experience through the recurring patterns arising fom embodimentperceptual cycles.  They Such patterns are “at once basic, holistic, and indefinitely analyzable,” (Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors 73).  They are propositional because they structure and constrain meaning, but they are also non-propositional compositions of integrated contexts that can be thought of as parts/areas offunctionfunctioning as figurative wholes, ( a whole, (Johnson, Body 168).  These figurative wholes, or gestalts, are evidences of imaginative logic lived through.  They provide familiar and organized frameworkss for that organize everyday experience. that are indispensible to the coherence and structure of experience.   
The embodied meaning of these gestalt structures is based on the figurative and pre-reflective organization of experience they afford, so defining characterizing them through languagelinguistically alone requires a bit of hand wavingcompetent and imaginative approach.  To facilitate the discussion of gestalt structures, Mark Johnson develops a series of “image schemata (abstract structures of images) that are ,” which are “irreducible gestalts” (Body In the Mind 44)” emerging from embodiment, (Body 44)..  These schemata,  as abstract structures of images, are dynamic diagrams of recurring patterns in embodied experience.  One example of an image schema structure that emerges diagrams from our physical experience is the ccontainment schema (IMAGE 6).  Johnson metaphorically extends the structure of this container schema into the corporeal experience of boundary to describe how we locate our bodies in other things, or conversely, other things in our bodies.  Examples of this in-out orientation are when we get in a hurry, or enter into a conversation.  We rinse our mouth out or come out of a deep sleep.  Johnson provides multiple evidences of the container schema recurrently organizing the in-out orientation of experience in similar ways.   Although these are candid linguistic examples, the primary containment metaphor is identifiably mapping into abstract domains.  In The Body in the Mind, Johnson provides a number of increasingly complex evidences of the container schema recurrently organizing an in-out orientation to experience in similar ways.  The result is a dynamic model of containment as a pervasive pre-reflectively gestalt structure constraining the experience of our normal orientation to the environment.  These structures are often automatic and unconscious, but they can be better understood through reflection.




	The empirical observation that all thought is inescapably imaginative suggests experience is always already imaginative.  In art and architecture, as experience, the affordances of primary metaphorical structures such as balance or verticality, can be explored through the projects and works of art.  Shared gestalt structures can bring coherent orientation to artistic experience.  In turn, artistic experience can present re-newed awareness of these structures and challenge the pervasiveness of their formal and pre-reflective structuring of our perceptual cycles.  The containment schema seems opposed to the metaphorical body of inhabitation.  How can art begin to change the gestalt structures of contemporary experience?
Gian Lorenzo Bernini is an exemplary Baroque artist who incorporates the embodied imagination into his sculptural projects.  Comprehensibility Tin the sculpture of David (1624),) affordsrelies on a pre-reflective projection of our sensorimotor understanding into the experience of the artistic work, relying on the imagination for comprehension.  David fundamentally orients the experience to thisan imaginative realm because his determined posture is directed toward something that is not literally present in the sculpture (IMAGE 8).  Our metaphorical predisposition structures this experience so that we “know” why David is in the middle of an action – an action that brings a meaningful and dynamic logic to the piece.   A pre-reflective understanding o Gf gestalt structures such as causation, verticality, balance, and force structures isare essential to this experience.  These primary gestalt structures expand the possibilities for synaesthetic interactionexperience through the embodied logic of organism-environment interaction always already part of experience.   This logic by presupposinges an embodied lived body that is structuring experience based onstructured on  the recurring patterns that emerge throughof sensorimotor interaction.  Contrasting the contained body removed from the intellectual perception of rhythm or balance, embodied logic suggests that rhythm and balance can only be inhabited and comprehended corporeally. 
…
Additions to/new contexts will inform and change the structures of experience,  and consequently, the types and kinds of projections that can occur in it, because the environmental context is interrelated and inseparable from these gestalt frameworks.  The faculties that accommodate gestalt structures and image schemata are primarily imaginative, because they emerge as interrelated patterns of embodiment that rely on a number of contextual structures.  The neuronal and cellular structures of energy that are also fundamental to gestalt structures are generally consistent throughout the human species.   However, our experience will always hinge on what we as living and conscious bodies are paying attention to, and therefore, it is the place-based structuring of embodiment that i am ready to address.
	





















































We have before us a Context-dependent synaesthetic and imaginative experience primarily structured by a relationship of body and environment intimately woven togetherareis woven together through the physical structures of corporeality.  We haveWith some idea how this weaving together is structured and how it emerges from our embodiment pre-reflectively orders our perceptual cycles, , but it remains to be clarified how these metaphorical/imaginativecorporeal structures, which are common to the human species, accommodate and contribute  afford an experience of placeto qualitative and subjective experience.    For this, I turn to A phenomenological awareness of the organism-environment interaction is here explored as a means to clarify this relationship and further illuminate the porosity of place. 

…
accounts of the body via phenomenological approaches.
	Our bodies have capabilities and limitations that are inherently creating/informing how we experience the world.  If we are in contact with and interacting with the world through ourO bodies, our experience is characterized by some level of orientation and directionality characterize interaction with/in the environment.  Our orientation dDependingepends on the structures of our bodily energiesquantifiable and physical structures of the body, qualitative and experiential structures of the body,  and the relationship of these structures to our environment.  We, experience might be can be oriented to the warm sun on our skinth and brightness of the sun, sadness over a loved one who has passed away, or thean gracefullness of a dancing ballerinaintriguing conversation.  The quality and feeling of each of these experiences implies a distinctly different orientation to the world.  This orientation is equivocal to a way we are in contact and interacting with the world, and it is evident that there are a diversity of modes or ways of being as such.  Although it may seem that directionality is characterized by our conscious identity, tThe physical structuringsensorimotor structures of our bodies implies are evidences that a majority of our contact withorientation to the world is unconsciously integratedsubconscious.  Often we only notice changes in our environment when we are sufficiently stimulated and the structure of our consciousness is shifted so that a new experienceConscious or not emerges.  
Before this restructuring of consciousness occurs, all “things” in experience are the elementspart of an integral integrated and heterogeneous background in experience that constitutes /affordsaffording all the possibilities of interaction with our environment.  In this sense, it is the primary characterization of our environment.   The identity of this background is inseparable from the body for whom it exists.  The depth and richness of the background relies on the organism and environment relationship.  Therefore, bCecause these two contexts are constantly changingemerging in the periphery of consciousness, the identityy of the background background isis context-dependent and never wholly fixed and consistentalways under construction in subjective experience, but is always developing and under constru.  Tction.  It is simultaneously the atmosphere of both subjective and objective realities.  Characterized by the interconnected relationship of the organism and environment, the background can be considered to incorporate the physical realms of the sensorimotor systems of the body, the imaginative structures of experience, the historical and social contexts of contemporary culture, and the “whole” environment.  It is only through the an interplay of all these embodied realms dimensions, that the background gains a unity asaffords a unified and “the inexhaustible reservoir from which all things are drawn,” (PontyMerleau-Ponty 344). 


	If we acknowledge a background as a background for usAs a background for some body, it seems implicit that we should also be able to identify athere is an accompanying  foreground that is synonymous with our the gaze inor /attention in/to the background.  In other words, tWhateverhat which is selected stands forth or is abstracted from the backgroundfrom the background determines the identity of the foreground in conscious experience .in relation to the background.   This foreground-background relationship characterizes ourthe visual domain of experience, but can also be identified as extending into figurative and imaginative realms that are not explicitly grasped.  While a perceiving body might regard conscious attention in/to the foreground as constituting “presence”– the feelings, memories, persons, places, and things in perception – there are contexts that are fundamental to the identity of these “things” butthat are not present in perception.  This observation reinforces the metaphorical gestalt structures previously described, which are also characterized by “whole” phenomena that are only imaginativelyfiguratively whole.
Within the background we assume that we can focus our gaze on things that are literally present or those things that are present only figuratively and imaginatively.   It is often the case that we have little or no control over our orientation because this focusing is embodied and cannot be absolutely free, do to reflexive and unconscious dimensions of experience.  
The processes of abstraction from background to foreground are essentially the dynamically structured relationship of organism and environment.  A perceiving subject generally constitutes the foreground as the things of consciousness – that is – as the nouns, persons, places, and things that we perceive.  These things are inherently metaphorical due to their interrelationships with the context and our bodies, as well as our synaesthetic perception of experience.  In this sense, we have a foreground of things characterized by imaginative structures that are not literally whole in perception, but can still be experienced as “wholes” in the foreground of the perceptual cycle.   Under this light, it seems impossible that we should be able to identify any “thing” as whole in itself or unrelated to the other things and contexts around it.

Physical and experiential structures of embodiment reveal that experience is characterized by relationships of being aware of the world, being in the world, and constituting the world all at the same time.  The separate identities of foreground and background are further called into question when we attempt to identify where each begins and ends in the organism-environment relationship.  Rather than being independent from one another, subject and object are inseparable in this relationship; it is in the body where this relationship between subject and object is realized.T   The identity of the perceived “things”environment  perceived in experience are is synonymous with thethe degree to which it is incorporated in to the patterns of  subject’s embodied experience (consciously and otherwise).   As tof them and the composition of thehe body’s subject’s  conscious conscious identity opens onto the structure of the environment around it, experience is also transformed by the possibilities afforded in this relation.  In this way, the environment that was previously only peripheral or unconscious,unconscious emerges in the body’s conscious flow of experience to occupy the attentive gaze.  The background thus becomes the foreground of experience, and vice versa, which implies an alteration of conscious structures without any necessary physical restructuring.  The interaction that results is inseparable from the interplay of contexts, but it is always already logically constrained and imaginative.  This is because human bodies are in contact with the world through their sensory systems, and thus, a subject can be so consumed by a particular realm of objective experience, that the independent structures of each realm (which exist in the background) disappears.  The more thoroughly these structures are allowed to integrate,  Beyond revealing a fundamental interrelatedness and porosity of things, imaginative foreground and background experience affords states of interaction between organism and environment in which the separate identities of each dissolve.  the more it seems that the subject’s experienced identity becomes caught up in that of the object, so that each deliquesce.  Presumably, due to the imaginative and metaphorical  interrelation of domains, this lack of finite boundaries within the interaction of the subject and object, much like the structures of foreground and background, pervades the identity of each.  Thus do , we have bodies in the world and making the world simultaneously. (??elaborate on this last sentence??).

For any experience of place to surface in the foreground of experience, it must also be an integral part of the background to which it stands in relation.  Now we are ready to project the interrelations of subject-object and background-foreground relationships into place based experience.  But the question remains, why do we understand place, in the first place?  Like synaesthetic and imaginative experience, place emerges through embodiment.  The human body, maintaining a relatively coherent, and stable form, always already in relationship to the contexts that surround it, is the most familiar source of orientation in experience.  The body is the place where foreground and background come together in experience.  Consequently all other places are characterized by the metaphorical identity of the human body. 




	TThe understanding of place necessarily hinges on the identity of the human body.  Inherently,  the identity of the body will structure our perception of place.   For example, Alberti and Le Corbusier,  conceive of the body isas aan containern object that is external andcontains the mind, but is primarily separate from the lived experience of architecture.  This dualistic body of containment presupposes an interior and exterior relationship in place because it is founded on the separation ofes anthe internal mind from the external body.  This leads to the troublingconfusing identities of inside and outside in the built environmentarchitectural experience because it supposes that the two realms of experience literally exist.  As with the other fragmented realms of experience that characterize the dualistic separation of mind and body (natural-artificial, self-other), distinctions of interior and exterior dissolve in the metaphorical body of inhabitation.  The comprehensive interrelatedness of cross-modal interaction between organism and environment suggest that the only separations in experience are imaginative.  Therefore, inside and outside are imaginativesymbolic realms of containment that can  be inhabited any way the body and environment can afford. 
Returning to the Blur project, we find an experience that relies on the inhabited body as the familiar source of place in experience.  The irregular and ephemeral form of the Blur project is not a likely place (IMAGE 9), yet it affords meaningful and oriented interaction and oriented inhabitation.  “Place” acquires an emergent identity from this interaction that simultaneously structures the identity of embodied experience.  In this process, foreground and background, organism and environment, time and space, self and other – dissolve in the porous place of inhabitation. 

…But this orientation and interaction with place can only emerge if the body is intimately involved.  like all other things, place “exists only for a subject who synthesizes it and embraces it in thought” (Ponty 255).  This interconnected ness is bounded together in the body, which can therefore be understood as the “zero-point” of experience, from which all things in experience are perceived.  This point, as body, is not a collection of objects or parts, but is “the horizon latent in all our experience and itself ever-present and anterior to every determining thought,” (Ponty 92).
There is no escaping the body.  Move however we wish, there is no getting further away.  Even if we could transport our conscious experience to some disembodied realm, our experience would still be constrained by the sensorimotor systems that construct experience and structure our thought processes on.  In these terms does the body constitute the zero-point that the world gains its orientation in our bodies.  This relationship is evidence of a place-based experiential structure that emerges from our embodiment.  Because our experience is fixed in our bodies (for the most part), we identify our bodies as a place that has limited characteristics.  However, the body as source is not removed from context and environment, and therefore the zero-point of experience is necessarily reliant on its relationship to its surroundings.  This consolidated form is another characteristic of embodiment that emerges as a source and experience of place.  

All of these contexts in relationship to each other, borrowing from and integrated in the body of the perceiver/acter, are inherently organized and patterned by the body.  These patterns aren’t formally geometric or cartographic, but are commonly shared and have a meaningful and coherent quality in experience.  It seems, in light of the bodily experience we are developing, geometric or cartographic experience of the world is as arbitrary as the rest.  Iit requires emotional preference and context(?)ual for its justification as experience for someone (just as any other order).  It seems to be a structural determinant of experience because some cultures uphold it as such.  That is to say, some of our ideas of order are drawn from the existing orders of experience, “the inside from the outside from the inside,” as Catherine Ingraham puts it (105).  It is possible that we order our experience based on the orders we are most familiar with in experience, rather than reflecting on the orders and analyzing their components as sets/networks of relationships. This recalls the earlier quote from Michel Foucault, “On what ‘table,’ according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things?” Dominant cultures are maintained via this lack of interaction with the structures of order.  Wwe must begin to understand order as both objective and subjective, as experienced via bodily structrures rather than intellectual concepts removed from ourselves as the constuents of experieence.
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